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Abstract. Recognizing that trust states are mental states, this paper presents a 
formal analysis of the dynamics of trust in terms of the functional roles and 
representation relations for trust states. This formal analysis is done both in a 
logical framework and in a mathematical framework based on integral and 
differential equations. Furthermore, the paper presents formal specifications of 
a number of relevant dynamic properties of trust. The specifications provided 
were used to perform automated formal analysis of empirical and simulated 
data from two case studies, one involving two experiments with humans, and 
one involving simulation experiments in the context of an economic game.  
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1   Introduction 
In the literature, a variety of definitions can be found for the notion of trust. The 
common factor in these definitions is that trust is a complex issue relating to belief in 
honesty, faithfulness, competence, and reliability of the trusted system actors, see e.g., 
[5, 6, 7, 13, 14, 19, 22, 23, 27]. Furthermore, the definitions indicate that trust depends 
on the context in which interaction occurs or on the observer’s point of view. The agent 
might for example trust that the statements made by another agent are true. Likewise, 
the agent might trust the commitment of another agent with respect to certain (joint) 
goals, or the agent might trust that another agent is capable of performing certain tasks.   
In [21] trust is analysed referring to observations which in turn lead to 
expectations: ‘observations that indicate that members of a system act according to 
and are secure in the expected futures constituted by the presence of each other for 
their symbolic representations.’ In [8] it is agreed that observations are important for 
trust, and trust is defined as: ‘trust is the outcome of observations leading to the belief 
that the actions of another may be relied upon, without explicit guarantee, to achieve a 
goal in a risky situation.’ Elofson [8] notes that trust can be developed over time as 
the outcome of a series of confirming observations. The evolution of trust over time, 
also called the dynamics of trust, is addressed in this paper. 
We conceive trust as an internal (mental) state property of an agent that may help 
him to conduct various kinds of complex behaviour. The cognitive concept trust 
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enables the agent to effectively cope with complex environments that are populated 
by self-interested agents. Trust is based on a number of factors, an important one 
being the agent’s own experiences with the subject of trust; e.g., another agent. Each 
event that can influence the degree of trust is interpreted by the agent to be either a 
trust-negative experience or a trust-positive experience. If the event is interpreted to 
be a trust-negative experience, the agent will lose its trust to some degree, if it is 
interpreted to be trust-positive, the agent will gain trust to some degree. The degree to 
which trust is changed depends on the characteristics of the agent. Agents equipped 
with a concept of trust perform a form of continual verification and validation of the 
subjects of trust over time. For example, a car is trusted, based on a multitude of 
experiences with that specific car, and with other cars in general. 
In this paper the dependence of trust on experiences obtained over time is the main 
focus, abstracting from other possible influences, which (as a form of idealisation) are 
assumed not present or constant. The dynamics of trust are formalised by sequences 
of mental states. The functional roles and the representation relations of trust states 
are formalised both in a logical and in a numerical mathematical way based on 
integral and differential equations. Properties of trust dynamics are formalised 
accordingly, incorporating logical and numerical aspects. Empirical and simulated 
data from two experiments with trust are formally analysed using an automated 
checker for such properties against traces [2]. The first experiment, called the scenario 
case study, studies dynamics of trust of humans when confronted with two different 
scenario’s. The other experiment, called the Trust & Tracing case study, is an agent-
based simulation of an economic game. 
Section 2 sketches the preliminaries for modelling trust dynamics using both 
mathematical and logical means. To properly catch the dynamics of trust as a 
cognitive phenomenon, Section 3 describes trust states as mental states for which the 
functional or causal roles and representation relations can be analysed and formally 
specified in logical terms. In Section 4 a continuous approach to trust dynamics is 
presented showing how functional role and representation relation specifications for 
trust states can be defined within Dynamical Systems Theory [25]. Section 5 presents 
a number of formally specified properties of trust used to analyse the case studies. 
The scenario case study is presented in Section 6; its formal analysis, based on 
properties formalised in Section 5, is presented in Section 7. The Trust & Tracing 
case study is presented in Section 8 and analysed in Section 9, using the properties 
from Section 5. Section 10 is a discussion. 
2   Preliminaries 
In this paper, trust is considered a mental agent concept that depends on experiences. 
This is modelled by a mathematical function that relates sequences of experiences to 
trust representations: a trust evolution function. As a computational alternative the 
iterative trust update function relates a current trust representation and a current 
experience to the next trust representation. To obtain a formal mathematical 
framework, the following four sets are introduced. A partially ordered set EV of 
experience values, a linearly ordered time frame TIME with initial time point 0, the set 
ES of experience sequences, i.e., functions from TIME to EV, and a partially ordered set 
TV of trust values. Examples of such sets EV and TV are the (closed) interval of real 
 Formal Analysis of Trust Dynamics in Human and Software Agent Experiments 345 
numbers between -1 and 1, the set {-1, 0, 1}, or sets of qualitative labels, such as {very 
high, high, neutral, low, very low}. Within the sets EV and TV, subsets of positive and 
negative values are distinguished. A trust evolution function is a function te : ES x 
TIME → TV. A trust update function is a function tu : E x TV → TV. Throughout this 
paper we assume that the value of a trust evolution function te at time t only depends 
on the experiences in the past of t (future independence). 
A logical formalisation is based on the language TTL [2]; this is a language in the 
class of reified predicate logic-based temporal languages as distinguished in [11, 12]. In 
TTL, state atoms are atoms over the state ontology Ont, such as experience(v) and trust(w), 
which express the experience value v from sort EV and trust value w from sort TV in a 
state, and for relations for these sorts such as <, pos and neg. A state is a truth 
assignment (of truth values true and false) to the set of (ground) state atoms; STATES(Ont) 
denotes the set of all states over state ontology Ont. A trace for state ontology Ont is a 
function γ: TIME → STATES(Ont); they form the set TRACES(Ont). The expression state(γ, t) 
|= p denotes that state property holds in the state of γ at time t. Here |= is an infix 
predicate of the language. Based on such atoms formulae can be formed using the 
predicate logic connectives, including quantifiers (e.g., over time and traces). 
3   Trust States and Mental States 
Following literature on Philosophy of Mind, such as [20], a mental state can be 
characterised in two manners: 
• by the functional role it plays, defining the immediate predecessor and successor 
states in causal chains in which it is involved 
• by its representation relations, defining how the mental state relates to other states 
more distant in locality and time 
For each of these two aspects, trust states will be analysed by a simple example. 
The Shop Example 
Consider the following example, concerning agent A and a specific shop. The 
behaviour of agent A considered is as follows: 
• agent A can go to the shop or avoid it 
• when meeting somebody, agent A can tell that it is a bad shop or that it is a good shop 
The following types of events determine the behaviour of agent A 
negative events: 
• an experience that a product bought in this shop was of bad quality  
• somebody else tells A that it is a bad shop 
• passing the shop, A observes that there are no customers in the shop 
positive events: 
• an experience that a product bought in this shop was of good quality  
• somebody else tells A that it is a good shop 
• passing the shop, A observes that there are customers in the shop 
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Assume for the sake of simplicity that only the last two experiences count for the 
behaviour of A, and that the past pattern a considered are histories in which the last two 
experiences are negative events. The future pattern b considered are the futures in which 
the agent avoids the shop and, when meeting somebody tells that it is a bad shop. It is 
assumed that, viewed from an external perspective, past pattern a leads to future pattern b. 
Functional Role Specifications for a Trust State 
Functional roles are described from a backward perspective (relating the trust state to 
states that lead to it) and a forward perspective (relating the trust state to states to 
which it leads). The trust state property ‘very negative’ is used as an illustration. For 
the forward perspective a relatively simple specification can be made; for example: 
Functional role specification: forward 
If the agent has very negative trust about the shop, then it will avoid the shop and 
when meeting somebody, (s)he will speak negatively about the shop. 
state(γ, t) |= trust(very_negative) ⇒ ∃t1≥ t  [  t≤t1≤t+d & ∀t2  [ t1≤t2≤t1+d ⇒   
[state(γ, t2) |= preparation_for(avoiding_shop)  & 
          state(γ, t2) |= conditional_preparation_for(meets(A, B), speaks_bad_about_shop_to(A, B)) ] ] 
Here preparation for an action leads to performing the action (unless it is blocked), 
and conditional preparation for an action leads to preparation for the action as soon as 
the condition is observed. The backward perspective is inherently less simple, since 
trust is a type of mental state property that accumulates over longer time periods. This 
means that trust at a next point in time depends on present experiences but also on the 
present trust state. This gives it a recursive character. For example, 
Functional role specification: backward 
If the agent has negative or very negative trust about the shop, and it has a negative 
experience, then it will have very negative trust. 
[state(γ, t) |= trust(negative) ∨ trust(very_negative)  &  state(γ, t) |= observes(e) & neg(e) ]  ⇒ 
     ∃t1≥t  [  t≤t1≤t+d & ∀t2  [ t1≤t2≤t1+d ⇒  state(γ, t1) |= trust(very_negative) ] 
A numerical example with trust decay rate r is as follows: 
If the agent has trust level w about the shop, and it has an experience of level v, then it 
will have trust of level rw+(1-r)v. 
[ state(γ, t) |= trust(w)  &  state(γ, t) |= observes(experience(v))   ⇒ 
   ∃t1≥t  [  t≤t1≤t+d & ∀t2  [ t1≤t2≤t1+d ⇒  state(γ, t1) |= trust(rw+(1-r)v) ] 
Note that in mathematical terms a backward functional role specification corresponds 
to a trust update function, and can be used directly in a computational manner for 
simulation. 
Representation Relations for a Trust State 
Trust is an example of a mental state property that heavily relies on histories of 
experiences, as also is found in empirical work; e.g. [17]. By abstracting from these 
histories in the form of a trust state that accumulates the history of experiences, the 
future dynamics can be described on the basis of the present mental state in a simple 
manner. Here the past pattern can be characterised by a formula ϕ(γ, t): 
   ∃t1<t2≤t [state(γ, t1) |= observes(e1) & state(γ, t2) |= observes(e2) &  
 neg(e1) & neg(e2)  &∀t3  [ t1≤t3≤t  ⇒  ¬ ∃e3  [ pos(e3)  &  state(γ, t3) |= observes(e3) ] ] 
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Moreover, the future pattern can be characterised by a ψ(γ, t): 
∃t1≥ t   state(γ, t1) |= performs(avoiding_shop)  &  ∀ t2 ≥ t  [ state(γ, t2) |= observes(meeting(A, B))  ⇒   
∃t3 ≥ t2  state(γ, t3) |= performs(speaking_bad_about_shop_to(A, B))] 
This obtains the following temporal relational specifications for the representational 
content of the trust state 
Representation relation: forward 
 ∀γ, t    [  state(γ, t) |= trust(very_negative)     ⇔    ψ(γ, t)  ] 
Representation relation: backward 
 ∀γ, t  [  ϕ(γ, t)    ⇔   state(γ, t) |= trust(very_negative)  ]   
A numerical example with trust decay rate r involves summation over time as follows: 
If t0 is a time point and d a duration and t1 = t0+d and the agent has at time point t0 
trust level w(t0) and at time points t between t0 and t1 it has experiences of level v(t), 
then at t1 it will have trust of level w(t1) =  rdw(t0) + (1-r)∑0≤d1≤d-1  rd1v(t0+d-d1). 
This property can be expressed in TTL as follows (here for any formula ϕ, the 
expression case(ϕ, v1, v2)  indicates the value v1 if ϕ is true, and  v2 otherwise): 
    [ state(γ, t0) |= trust(w0)  &    w1 = rd w0 + (1-r) Σk=0d Σv:EV  case(state(γ, t0+k) |= experience(v), rd-kv, 0) 
    ⇒ state(γ, t0+d) |= trust(w1) ]  
In Section 4 an analysis of representation relations and functional role specifications 
for continuous trust values over continuous time in terms of the Dynamical Systems 
Theory [25] (based on integral and differential equations) will be presented.  
4   A Continuous Approach 
The notions functional role and representation relation can be analysed in a continuous 
form as well. This section considers a continuous mental state property for trust over 
continuous time. As an example, it is assumed that trust in the weather forecast depends 
on one’s experiences based on continuously monitoring the actual weather and 
comparing the observed weather with the predicted weather. For some of the patterns of 
behaviour, decisions may depend on your trust in the weather forecast. In particular, the 
decision to take an umbrella depends not only on the weather forecast, but also on your 
trust in the weather forecast. For example, when the weather forecast is not bad, but  
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Fig. 1. Trust for continuous experiences (a) without decay and (b) with decay 
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your trust is low, you still will take an umbrella with you. It is assumed that for each 
point in time your experience with the weather forecast is a modelled by value (real 
number) between -1 (negative experience) and 1 (positive experience).  
As a first approach (for reasons of presentation leaving decay aside for a moment) 
the accumulation of experiences in trust may be described by averaging the 
accumulation of the shaded area of the graph of experiences values over time, shown 
in Figure 1. So, a trust state represents a kind of average of the experiences over time. 
More specifically, the trust value is taken to be the real number indicating the shaded 
area divided by the length of the time interval, where the parts below the time axis 
count as negative. Within an overall trace γ the relation between trust value tvγ(t) at a 
certain point in time t > 0 and the experience history can be modelled by the 
following backward representation relation for the trust state, expressed by an integral 
over time until t of the experience value evγ(t), i.e., 
tvγ(t) =  ∫0t evγ(u) du / t 
where for a trace γ the functions tv, ev are defined by: 
tvγ(t) = v    iff   state(γ, t, internal) |= has_value(trust, v) 
evγ(t) = w    iff   state(γ, t, input) |= has_value(experience, w) 
This shows the cumulative character of a (backward) representation relation. A 
functional role specification has a more local character. Such a local relationship can 
be modelled by a differential equation, which can be found from the integral relation  
t  tvγ(t) =  ∫0t evγ(u) du  
by differentiation and application of the product rule as follows: 
d/dt  t. tvγ(t) = d/dt  ∫0t evγ(u) du 
(d/dt  t) . tvγ(t) + t. d/dt  tvγ(t) = evγ(t) 
tvγ(t) + t. d/dt  tvγ(t) = evγ(t)   
Therefore the following differential equation is obtained: 
dtvγ(t) / dt = [ evγ(t) - tvγ(t) ] / t 
In discretised form this provides: 
tvγ(t+ Δt) = tvγ(t) + [[ evγ(t) - tvγ(t) ] / t ]  Δt 
This shows the backward functional role specification for a trust state, which has the 
form of a trust update function and can be used for simulation (based on Euler’s 
method; also the more efficient higher-order Runge-Kutta methods are applicable). 
The example shows that, for continuous models, characterisations of representation 
relations and functional role specifications show up that are formulated in terms of 
integrals or differential equations. This provides an interesting connection of the 
higher-level cognitive concept trust to the Dynamical Systems Theory as advocated, 
for example, in [25]. In the above example, it is not realistic that experiences very far 
back in time count the same as recent experiences. In the accumulation of trust, 
experiences further back in time will have to count less than more recent experiences, 
based on a kind of inflation rate, or increasing memory vagueness. Therefore a more 
realistic model is obtained if it is assumed that the graph of experience values against 
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time is modified to fit it between two curves that are closer to zero further back in 
time. Trust then is the accumulation of the areas in the graph below, where the parts 
below the time axis count negative. 
The limiting curves can be based, for example, on an exponential function eat with 
a > 0 a real number related to the strength of the decay. The graph in Figure 1b depicts 
the resulting function  evγ(t) eat. Under these assumptions the representation relation 
between trust and experiences can be modelled by the integral 
tvγ(t) =  ∫0t evγ(u) eau du . a / (eat - 1) 
where the factor a / (eat - 1) is a normalisation factor to normalise trust in the interval [-
1, 1]. As before, a functional role specification for the trust state in the form of the 
following differential equation can be obtained: 
dtvγ(t)/dt   = [ evγ(t) - tvγ(t) ] . a eat / (eat - 1) 
= [ evγ(t) - tvγ(t) ] . a  / (1 – e-at) 
5   Properties of Trust 
In [18] a number of possible properties of trust evolution and trust update functions 
are defined in mathematical terms. For motivation and further explanation we refer to 
the reference mentioned. This paper contributes formalisation of the properties in 
logical terms. The following properties from [18] are considered (here e,f∈ES, 
γ∈TRACES, s,t,u ∈ TIME, v∈EV, w∈TV, and e|≤t denotes the restriction of sequence e to time 
points ≤ t). 
Future independence. Future independence expresses that trust only depends on past 
experiences, not on future experiences. This is a quite natural assumption that is 
assumed to hold for all trust evolution functions. In mathematical terms: 
e|≤t = f|≤t  & te(e, 0) = te(f, 0)     ⇒ te(e, t) = te(f, t)   
This property can be expressed logically in TTL [2] as follows: 
∀γ1, γ2, t   [ ∀w [ state(γ1, 0) |= trust(w) ⇔ state(γ2, 0) |= trust(w) ]  & 
∀t1≤t  ∀v [ state(γ1, t1) |= experience(v) ⇔ state(γ2, t1) |= experience(v) ] ] ⇒  
∀w [ state(γ1, t) |= trust(w) ⇔ state(γ2, t) |= trust(w) ] 
Note that as the property refers to two different histories (and compares them), it 
cannot be expressed in modal temporal logic: then only reference can be made to one 
history. 
Limited memory d. Limited memory expresses that trust only depends on past 
experiences in a certain time interval of duration d back in time from the present. In 
mathematical terms: 
e|≥t-d = f|≥t-d  ⇒ te(e, t) = te(f, t)   
This property can be expressed logically in TTL as follows: 
∀γ1, γ2, t   [ ∀t1≤t  [ t1≥t-d ⇒  
∀v [ state(γ1, t1) |= experience(v) ⇔ state(γ2, t1) |= experience(v) ] ] ⇒  
∀w [ state(γ1, t) |= trust(w) ⇔ state(γ2, t) |= trust(w) ] 
Trust Monotonicity. Monotonicity expresses that the more positive experiences are, 
the higher the trust. Mathematically: 
e ≤ f   &   te(e, 0) ≤ te(f, 0)      ⇒    te(e, t) ≤  te(f, t) 
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Note that this property again refers to two different histories; it can be expressed 
logically as follows: 
∀γ1, γ2, t     
[ ∀w1,w2 [ state(γ1, 0) |= trust(w1) & state(γ2, 0) |= trust(w2) ⇒ w1≤w2]  &  ∀t1≤t  ∀v1,v2  
[ state(γ1, t1) |= experience(v1) & state(γ2, t1) |= experience(v2) ⇒ v1≤v2]  ] ⇒  ∀w1,w2 [ state(γ1, t) |= 
trust(w1) &  state(γ2, t) |= trust(w2) ⇒ w1≤w2] 
The two different histories again imply that this property cannot be expressed in 
modal temporal logic. 
Positive trust extension. Positive (or negative) trust extension expresses that trust is 
increasing if only positive (negative) experiences are encountered, i.e., after a positive 
(negative) experience, trust will become at least as high (low) as it was. In 
mathematical terms: 
∀s,t  [∀u ∈ TIME [ s ≤ u < t  ⇒ eu  positive  ]   ⇒   te(e, s) ≤ te(e, t) 
This property can be expressed logically as follows 
∀s,t   [∀u ∀v [ s ≤ u < t  &  state(γ, u) |= experience(v)  ⇒  pos(v) ] ] 
⇒  ∀w1,w2 [ state(γ, s) |= trust(w1) & state(γ, t) |= trust(w2) ⇒ w1≤w2] 
Trust Flexibility: degree of trust gaining d. The property degree of trust gaining (or 
dropping) expresses, independent of the trust state, after how many positive (or 
negative) experiences trust will be positive (or negative). In mathematical terms: 
∀t   [∀k ∈ TIME [ t-d < k ≤ t  ⇒ ek negative ]  ⇒   te(e, t) negative 
This property can be expressed logically as follows 
∀t, d  [ state(γ, t) |= trust(w) & ∀t1  [ [t-d≤t1≤t  &  state(γ, t1) |= experience(v) ]  ⇒ pos(v) ]  ⇒  pos(w) ] 
Positive limit approximation. Positive limit approximation expresses that it is 
always possible to reach maximal trust, if a sufficiently long period with only positive 
experiences is encountered (the same for the negative case). Mathematically: 
If a t exists such that for all s > t it holds that es is maximal (in EV),  
then a  t' exists such that te(e, t) is maximal (in TV) for all t > t'. 
This property can be expressed logically as follows: 
   ∃t ∀t1≥t [ state(γ, t1) |= experience(v) ⇒ ¬ ∃v1 v1>v ] ⇒  ∃t' ∀t1≥t' [ state(γ, t1) |= trust(w) ⇒ ¬ ∃w1 w1>w ] 
This property can be relaxed a bit by specifying a margin such that trust should 
become that close to the maximal value. In [18] also the following properties of trust 
update functions are defined and related to properties of trust evolution functions. 
They are formalised logically as follows. 
Trust Update Monotonicity. A trust update function tu is monotonic if higher 
experience values and higher trust values lead to higher trust update values. In 
mathematical terms: 
ev1 ≤ ev2  &  tv1 ≤ tv2  ⇒  tu(ev1, tv1) ≤ tu(ev2, tv2) 
This property can be expressed logically as follows 
∀γ1, γ2, t ∀v1,v2, w1, w2 [state(γ1, t) |= experience(v1) ∧ trust(w1)& 
state(γ2, t) |= experience(v2) ∧ trust(w2) ⇒ v1≤v2 & w1≤w2]  ⇒   
∀w1,w2 [ state(γ1, t+1) |= trust(w1) & state(γ2, t+1) |= trust(w2) ⇒ w1≤w2] 
Positive and negative trust extension. This property states that positive (negative) 
experiences lead to higher (lower) trust values. In mathematical terms: 
 ev  positive  ⇒  tu(ev, tv) ≥ tv 
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This property can be expressed in logical terms as follows: 
∀v1,w1,w2 [ [ state(γ, t) |= experience(v1) ∧ trust(w1) &  state(γ, t+1) |= trust(w2) ] ⇒ w1≤w2] 
Strict positive (negative) monotonic progression. This property is a stronger 
version of the previous one and states that positive (negative) experiences lead to 
strictly higher (lower) trust values, as long as this is possible. In mathematical terms: 
ev positive and tv not maximal (in T)  ⇒  tu(ev, tv) > tv 
This property can be expressed logically as follows 
∀v1,w1,w2 [ [ state(γ, t) |= experience(v1) ∧ trust(w1) & ∃w3 w3>w1  &  state(γ, t+1) |= trust(w2) ]⇒ w1<w2] 
Negative or positive trust fixation of degree d.  After d negative events the agent 
will never trust anymore and its trust will remain the least possible. After d positive 
events the agent will forever trust (even when faced with negative events) and its trust 
will remain maximal. 
∀t, d  [ state(γ, t) |= trust(w) &  ∀t1 [ [t-d≤t1≤t  &  state(γ, t1) |= experience(v) ]  ⇒ pos(v) ]  ⇒   
∀t2≥t  [ state(γ, t) |= trust(w2) ⇒  ¬∃w  w>w2 ] 
6   The Scenario Case Study 
This section describes an experiment based on 294 subjects, taken from [17]. From 
the 294 subjects, 238 subjects (81%) completed the full questionnaire. The other 19% 
of the subjects were either not able to complete the questionnaire because of technical 
problems, decided to stop during the experiment, or did not respond to a question 
within a given time limit of 15 minutes between each two questions. Only the data 
obtained from subjects that fully completed the questionnaire have been used. In the  
 
1
2
3
4
5
pos
1
pos
2
pos
3
pos
4
pos
5
neg
1
neg
2
neg
3
neg
4
neg
5
tr
u
s
t v
a
lu
e
1
2
3
4
5
neg
1
neg
2
neg
3
neg
4
neg
5
pos
1
pos
2
pos
3
pos
4
pos
5
tr
u
s
t v
a
lu
e
 
1
2
3
4
5
pos
1
pos
2
pos
3
pos
4
pos
5
neg
1
neg
2
neg
3
neg
4
neg
5
tr
u
st
 v
al
u
e
1
2
3
4
5
neg
1
neg
2
neg
3
neg
4
neg
5
pos
1
pos
2
pos
3
pos
4
pos
5
tr
u
s
t v
a
lu
e
 
Fig. 2. Dynamics of trust in Photocopier (upper two), resp. Travel Agency (lower two) 
experiments, both for positive experiences first and negative experiences first 
352 T. Bosse et al. 
test the effect of experiences with an organisation or an object on the trust in that 
organisation or object is measured. The effect of the experiences on trust is measured 
by describing various experiences in small stories and instructing the subject to 
express his or her trust in the object or organisation after having gone through such 
experiences, using a five-points trust rating scale [17]. In this scale, trust value 3 
represents neutral trust, value 4 and 5 represent positive trust, and value 1 and 2 
represent negative trust. 
Each scenario consisted of an introduction and ten distinctive stories, five of which 
were positive (written and validated as to induce trust) and five of which were 
negative (written and validated as to induce distrust). For more details, see [17]. In 
Figure 2 the median of the trust values of the population for both the photocopier and 
the travel agency are plotted. It shows that indeed trust increases when the subject had 
a positive experience and that trust decreases upon a negative experience. There is a 
clear difference between plots starting with negative experiences and plots that start 
with positive experiences. To determine the significance of this difference, a 2-way 
between subjects ANOVA test was performed on the means of the positive and 
negative experiences within a single scenario. The ANOVA test takes both the 
experience (positive or negative) and the order in which experiences are presented 
(positive-first or negative-first) into account. The results show that both factors have 
an effect on trust in the object or organisation at a significance level beyond 0,001. 
7   Analysis of the Scenario Case Study 
The outcomes of the experiments as described in Section 6 and (in particular) the 
traces shown in Figure 2 have been compared to the most relevant dynamic properties 
from Section 5: 
Positive and negative trust extension. These properties are satisfied for all four 
types of human traces shown in Figure 2.  
Strict positive and negative monotonic progression. These properties failed 
according to the TTL checker [2] for all four human traces, probably due to the low 
number of possible trust values (if there are few trust values to choose from, people 
do not always choose a new trust value after a new experience).  
Trust Flexibility. The property succeeds for all four human traces, given the right 
value for d. For example, for the photocopier, 3 negative experiences in a row are 
sufficient to get a negative trust (no matter how positive trust was), and for the 
travelling agency 2 negative experiences are sufficient. For the positive side, in both 
cases only 1 positive experience is sufficient to get trust positive again, so the 
property ‘degree of trust gaining 1’ holds for both cases. An effect that does occur, 
however, in the photocopier context, is that after a series of negative experiences, the 
level of trust does not become as high as in the case of no negative experiences (see 
Figure 2). More refined properties than the ones above can be formulated to account 
for this relative form of trust fixation. Notice that in the travelling agency context this 
effect does not occur. 
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Positive limit approximation. This property assumes that the traces under 
investigation are of infinite length. Therefore, it makes no sense to check it against the 
traces of this case study. (For example, if for t one chooses the last time point of the 
trace, then the property is not very informative). However, analytically it can be 
shown that for the photocopier an upper limit of 5 and a lower limit of 2 are reached, 
whilst for the travel agency an upper limit of 4 and a lower limit of 2 are reached.  
Limited memory d. According to the TTL checker, this property succeeds for all four 
human traces, given the right value for d. This can be illustrated by considering the 
same example as for Trust Flexibility above: for the photocopier, 3 negative 
experiences in a row are sufficient to get a negative trust (no matter what the previous 
trust value was), and for the travelling agency 2 negative experiences are sufficient. 
8   Trust and Tracing Case Study 
The Trust and Tracing game [24] is a research tool designed to study human 
behaviour with respect to trust in commodity supply chains and networks in different 
institutional and cultural settings. The game played by human participants is used 
both as a tool for data gathering and as a tool to make participants feed back on their 
daily experiences. 
The focus of study is on trust in a business partner when acquiring or selling 
commodities with invisible quality. There are five roles: traders (producers, 
middlemen and retailers), consumers and a tracing agency. The real quality of a 
commodity is known by producers only. Sellers may deceive buyers with respect to 
quality, to gain profits. Buyers have either to rely on information provided by sellers 
(Trust) or to request a formal quality assessment at the Tracing Agency (Trace). This 
costs a tracing fee for the buyer if the product is what the seller stated (honest). The 
agency will punish untruthful sellers by a fine. Middleman and Retailers have an 
added value for the network by their ability to trace a product cheaper than a 
consumer can. 
Commodities usually flow from producers to middlemen, from middlemen to 
retailers and from retailers to consumers. Players receive ‘monopoly’ money upfront. 
Producers receive sealed envelopes representing lots of commodities. Each lot is of a 
certain commodity type (represented by the colour of the envelope) and of either low 
or high quality (represented by a ticket covered in the envelope). The envelopes may 
only be opened by the tracing agency, or at the end of the game to count points 
collected by the consumers. The player who has collected most points is the winner in 
the consumer category. In the other categories the player with maximal profit wins. 
Sessions played until 2005, see [16], provided insights, such as: participants who 
know and trust each other beforehand tend to start trading faster and trace less. The 
afterwards indignation about deceits that had not been found out during the game is 
higher in these groups than it is when participants do not know each other. The 
objective of [16] was to model the behaviour of sellers and buyers using the concept 
of trust. The model is inspired by [19] who define reliability trust as “trusting party’s 
probability estimate of success of the transaction”. This choice allows for considering 
economic aspects; agents may decide to trade with low-trust partners if loss in case of 
deceit is low. In the paper trust is defined as a subjective probability. This choice 
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allows trust to be related with risk. In the agent-based simulations of [16], the agent’s 
trust model is based on tracing results and the trust update schema proposed in [18]: 
trustt+1(δ+)=(1-δ+) trustt+δ+ if the experience is positive 
trustt+1(δ-)=(1-δ-) trustt         if the experience is negative 
where trustt represents trust after the t transactions. The value of trust=1 represents 
complete trust, trust=0 represents complete distrust, and trust=0.5 represents complete 
uncertainty. This model is an asymmetric trust update function, with either completely 
positive or completely negative experience. A negative experience, or losing 
something, may have stronger impact than a positive experience, or gaining the same 
thing. This is known as the endowment effect [1, 26]. δ+ and δ- are impact factors of 
positive and negative experiences respectively. They are related by an endowment 
coefficient e.   
δ+  = e δ- ,  0<e≤1 
This trust update function has the following properties: monotonicity, positive and 
negative trust extension, and strict positive and negative progression. 
For buyers, trading entails the trust-or-trace decision. In human interaction, this 
decision depends on human factors that are not sufficiently well understood to 
incorporate in a multi-agent system. To not completely disregard these intractable 
factors, the trust-or-trace decision is modelled as a random process instead of as a 
deterministic process. The agglomerate of all these intractable factors is called the 
confidence factor. The distribution involves experience-based trust in the seller, the 
value ratio of high versus low quality, the cost of tracing, and the buyer’s confidence 
factor. 
Tracing reveals the real quality of a commodity. The tracing agent executes the 
tracing and punishes cheaters as well as traders reselling bad commodities in good 
faith. The tracing agent only operates on request and requires some tracing fee. 
Several factors influence the tracing decision to be made after buying a commodity. 
The most important factors for the current research are the buyer’s trust in seller and 
his confidence. Trust is modelled as a subjective evaluation of the probability that the 
seller would not cheat on the buyer. Confidence reflects the preference of a particular 
player to trust rather than trace, represented as a value on the interval [0,1]. The other 
factors are: the satisfaction ratio of the commodity (tracing makes more sense for 
valuable products than for products with small satisfaction ratio), and the tracing costs 
which depend on the depth to be traced.  
Agent models were validated against the game sessions played by the humans (see 
[16] for details). Thus, computer simulations were performed for the same game 
setups with populations of 15 agents: 3 producers, 3 middlemen, 3 retailers, 6 
consumers. A set of validation game setups (combinations of free parameters of the 
agent models) was built to be able to compare output of the computer simulations and 
the results of the human games. The values of free parameters were selected 
uniformly from their definition intervals to confirm the models capability to 
reproduce desired input-output relationships and explore their sensitivities. Some of 
the highlights of the outcomes are as follows. 
Effects of confidence on tracing. The difference in output variables with respect to 
high and low levels of confidence is not significant for neutral risk-taking agents (i.e., 
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agents that evaluate the potential profit equally high as the risk of deception in their 
buying/selling decision function). For high-risk-taking agents (i.e., agents that prefer 
potential profit over the risk of deception) the amount of traces decreases for highly 
confident players and increases for lowly confident players. 
Effects of confidence on cheating. The number of cheats is high for highly confident 
players in games with dominating number of risk-neutral players. Surprisingly, the 
results show the opposite for risk-taking players: some dishonest sellers do not get 
traced and punished in highly risk-taking game configurations, so they are encouraged 
to continue their fraudulent practices. 
Effects of confidence on certification and guaranteeing. The number of guarantees 
is linked with agent’s confidence through the concept of the tracing trust. High 
confidence leads to a lower number of traces, meaning fewer deceptions are 
discovered and consequently a higher average tracing trust. High tracing trust 
decreases the seller’s risk and thus increases number of guarantees provided by the 
seller (a guarantee increase seller’s costs in case of deception). 
In all experiments, effects of risk-taking attitude are consistent: high risk-taking 
leads to more cheating, less certificates and increased willingness to give guarantees 
and to rely on them. Differences in risk-taking attitude outweigh changes in other 
parameters. This result corresponds with observations from human games. 
9   Analysis of Trust and Tracing Case Study 
The model as introduced in the previous section has been tested in a case study. 
According to [15], initial trust and honesty of the agents have the strongest influence 
on the evolution of trust throughout the game. Thus, the following 4 games with 
homogeneous agents were chosen from the validation set of the game setups to be 
played using the multi-agent simulation system: 
• Distrusting buyers and dishonest sellers 
• Distrusting buyers and honest sellers 
• Trusting buyers and dishonest sellers 
• Trusting buyers and honest sellers 
Distrusting buyers have a low initial value of trust (0.1) and develop trust when 
confronted with honest sellers. Vice versa, trusting buyers have a high initial trust 
value (1.0) and decrease it through tracing and discovering cheaters in games with 
dishonest sellers. One additional game was played having only one dishonest agent 
and in which the rest of the agents are all honest and trusting. Each game played is 
logged as set of traces generated by each of the agents. Each trace logs the trust and 
honesty values, and all experiences influencing these. In the logs the trust of an agent 
is represented by the predicate  
has_cheating_trust(AgentA,AgentB,trust_value).  
This expression means that AgentA has trust value of trust_value w.r.t. AgentB. The 
positive experience influencing the AgentA’s trust is recorded using predicate 
successful_trade(AgentA, AgentB). The predicate has_cheated(AgentA, AgentB) represents the 
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negative experience (a cheat has been discovered by the tracing agency) that AgentB 
cheated on AgentA. In a similar way agents log their honesty level that is updated in 
the same way as their level of trust. The predicate has_honesty(AgentA, honesty_value) 
represents the current value of honesty of AgentA. If the predicate potential_cheat(AgentA) 
holds, then the value of the honesty of AgentA decreases. If the predicate 
punishment(AgentA) holds, then the honesty value of AgentA increases. 
The game traces were checked against a number of trust properties proposed in 
Section 5. To this end, the properties of Section 5 have been slightly modified, to 
make them compatible with the predicates as mentioned above. For example, the 
properties have been parameterised with a variable for the trusting agent and a 
variable for the trusted agent, and have been checked for all combinations of agents. 
The results were as follows: 
Positive and negative trust extension. The TTL checker [2] showed that these 
properties hold for the trust model of the software agents in the Trust and Tracing 
game. This fact can be also confirmed analytically by the trust update function (see 
Section 8).  
Strict positive and negative monotonic progression. These properties were also 
confirmed by the TTL checker for all software agents. This is a consequence of the 
fact that the software agents update their trust using only strictly positive or negative 
experiences. 
Trust flexibility. The automated checks pointed out that this property holds only for a 
part of the traces for a given value of d. This effect can be explained by the 
differences in the initial value of trust in the agents across the different games. 
Furthermore, due to the randomness of the agent’s partner selection and the 
endowment effect (see Section 8) model and the time limits of the games the agents 
can have insufficient number of trades (experiences) to establish positive trust level . 
Positive limit approximation.  As explained in Section 7, it makes no sense to check 
this property against traces of finite length. However, analytically it can be shown that 
the trust update function converges to the maximum level of trust (1.0) while the 
agent perceives a continuous sequence of positive experiences.  
Limited memory d. According to the TTL checker this property does not hold for the 
software agents. After each new experience value and performed trust update, the 
agents still remember all the previous experiences. The history of the experiences is 
weighted, meaning that the older an experience gets the lower its weight in the current 
value of trust. In addition, the weight drops exponentially causing the agent to ignore 
old experiences rapidly. 
10   Discussion 
This paper focused on the dependence of trust on experiences over time, abstracting 
from other possible influences, which are assumed as an idealisation to be not present 
or constant. For trust states as mental states, following literature in Philosophy of 
Mind such as [20], functional role and representation relation specifications were 
formalised both in a logical way and in a numerical mathematical way according to a 
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Dynamical Systems Theory approach (based on integral and differential equations; cf. 
[25]). It is shown how a backward functional role specification in mathematical terms 
corresponds to a trust update function in the discrete case and a differential equation 
in the continuous case and is directly usable in a computational manner for 
simulation. Moreover, it is shown how a backward representation relation can be 
obtained (as a repeated application of the functional role specification) by a 
summation (discrete case) or integration (continuous case) of the (inflating) 
experiences over time. 
Trust may be influenced by experiences of different types. This paper models 
differences between experiences by mapping them into one overall set of distinct 
experience ‘values’. In addition, more explicit distinctions between different 
dimensions of experience could be made. Also other cognitive or emotional  
factors could be integrated, such as the concept of expectation. The work presented in 
[5, 8, 13, 14] addresses some of these other aspects of trust, which could be 
integrated. This is left for future work. 
In our work we focus on the dynamic properties of the trust models where trust is 
represented by a single variable. However, we acknowledge the fact that trust is a 
complex cognitive phenomenon [5] and might be represented by multiple factors or 
have a more complex relationship with decision making in humans and software 
agents. To apply our analytical method in such complex cases break down the trust 
model into single aspect. For each single aspect the proposed dynamic properties can 
be studied. As an example, this method was applied to the Trust and Tracing case 
study [14, 15], where different types of trust are used depending on the context of the 
decision making. The trust-or-trace decision is based on the cheating trust that 
estimates the subjective probability of truthful behaviour of the opponent while the 
partner selection decision is based on the negotiation trust, revealing the subjective 
probability of reaching an agreement with a given partner.  
The requirements imposed on models for trust dynamics may depend on individual 
characteristics of agents; therefore, a variety of models that capture these 
characteristics may be needed. The approach put forward here enables the explication 
of these characteristics. Formal specification of both qualitative and quantitative 
models is supported, based on trust evolution functions and trust update functions. 
Validation has taken place on the basis of extensive empirical and simulated data in 
different contexts. 
To formalise and analyse dynamic phenomena, often it is implicitly or explicitly 
claimed that temporal logic, e.g., linear time or branching time temporal logic, is 
useful; e.g., [3, 9, 10] Other literature claims that the Dynamical Systems Theory, 
based on differential equations is a suitable approach to dynamics of cognitive 
phenomena; cf. [25]. In this study it has been found that a number of basic properties 
for trust dynamics cannot be expressed in standard temporal logic, nor in the form of 
integral and differential equations. For example, the quite elementary property ‘trust 
monotonicity’ that expresses that better experiences lead to more trust is not 
expressible. The reason for this lack of expressivity is the impossibility to refer to and 
compare different histories. In the logical language TTL used here, traces are first 
class citizens; for example, variables and quantifiers can be used over them. In this 
way explicit reference can be made to histories, and they can be compared. 
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